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BOOK REVIEWS
Reasons, Rights, and Values, by Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press, 
2015. Pp. x + 301. $34.99 (paperback).
RYAN W. DAVIS, Brigham Young University
Robert Audi’s Reasons, Rights, and Values articulates an expansive, unified 
view of moral philosophy, beginning with the nature of reasons and ex-
tending through normative ethics to first order questions of social and 
political philosophy. The chapters comprising the volume are selected 
from journals and other collections, collectively spanning the last decade 
or so. Reasons, Rights, and Values organizes them in a way that helpfully 
illuminates the coherence and systematicity of Audi’s significant contribu-
tions to practical philosophy. The book is divided into three parts of three 
or four chapters each, focusing in succession on reasons and rationality, 
obligation and virtue, and political philosophy—notably with an eye to 
the role of religion in politics. After a brief review of the book’s themes, 
I’ll raise a few concluding questions about the argument that might be of 
particular interest to philosophers of religion.
The first chapter introduces several categories of practical reasons. 
Audi says we have “adequate” reason to perform an action when there 
is a practical reason favoring it, and no such reason opposing it (15). If it 
would be irrational not to perform an action, then there is “compelling” 
reason in favor of it (15). Practical reasoning is analogous to theoretical 
reasoning in that a reasoner generally moves from purposive and instru-
mental premises to practical conclusions (which specify the action to be 
done). When the premises make it as reasonable to believe the practical 
conclusion as its opposite, then the reasoning meets what Audi calls a 
“minimal adequacy pattern” (23). If they would render it irrational not to 
draw the conclusion, the premises meet the “standard adequacy pattern” 
(23). This mode of reasoning from ends to means might evoke Kant’s hy-
pothetical imperative—an idea the chapter develops at length. One aim in 
elaborating this idea is to support the claim that hypothetical imperatives’ 
normativity depends on the existence of a categorical imperative.
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The next chapters advance an account of intrinsic value as a source of 
reasons. For Audi, experiences are the bearers of intrinsic value. It fol-
lows that only subjects capable of having experiences can be centers of 
intrinsic value, and so intrinsic value is mind-dependent. An object can 
have inherent value if the experience of it is intrinsically good. Reasons 
for action are tied directly to intrinsic value (and indirectly to inherent 
value). Contrary to some philosophers, such reasons need not always be 
understood as facts.
Audi is a well-known defender of the view that access to moral prin-
ciples is available through intuition. Following Ross, Audi proposes prin-
ciples of “justice and non-injury, of fidelity and veracity, of beneficence 
and self-improvement, of reparation and gratitude . . . and of liberty and 
respectfulness” (130). Some intuitions are self-evident, or non-inferentially 
justified. In such cases, simply understanding the proposition in question 
can be sufficient justification for believing it. Clarifying specifically moral 
concepts will include, at least in part, appeal to the Rossian principles. A 
puzzle for this project is how to unify the prima facie moral obligations 
this intuitionist strategy yields. In response, Audi appeals to the Kantian 
“Humanity Formula” of the categorical imperative. If the Humanity For-
mula is to be a “basic guide” to our moral judgments, it can inform our 
search for final moral obligations (150). Without prior moral inputs, the 
Humanity Formula shows that the Rossian principles are reasonable to ac-
cept. Given the intuitive appeal of the Rossian principles, the fact that the 
Humanity Formula can explain them in a unified way is, in turn, a source 
of abductive support for the Humanity Formula itself.
The Humanity Formula articulates both a negative standard (forbid-
ding using persons as a means) and a positive one (that persons ought 
to be treated as ends). Audi interprets the negative standard to prohibit, 
inter alia, actions treating others in ways that show disregard for any 
“non-instrumental aspects” of the person (170). For example, one should 
not make an employee do something dangerous without any consider-
ation of the employee’s welfare. We should also develop our characters 
in ways that cultivate a disposition to treat others as ends. Audi then 
proposes a series of principles for weighting the Rossian obligations. In 
general, if there is a conflict among prima facie obligations, but one ac-
tion is better supported by the Humanity Formula, or one action better 
complies with multiple prima facie obligations, that can break the tie. 
Other weighting principles include aggregation, equality, priority of the 
worst off, etc. Particularly noteworthy, Audi forwards what he terms a 
“principle of secular rationale” (177–178), which places citizens under a 
prima facie obligation not to advocate for a law without adequate secular 
reason supporting it. This principle is supported by a “principle of toler-
ance,” forbidding proponents of coercion about some question to regard 
themselves as epistemically superior to proponents of liberty about that 
question (178).
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The volume next addresses questions of moral virtue (chs. 7–8). One 
can, of course, do the right thing without the right reason—thereby failing 
to be virtuous. Audi discusses a variety of dimensions to virtue, which 
include motivation, among others. As Kant realized, it can be difficult 
to know one’s own motivations, and we can also lack direct control over 
them. However, we do have means for resisting motivations, and so a 
kind of indirect or negative control.
Generally speaking, virtues are praiseworthy character traits, involving 
both cognitive and motivational aspects. Audi uses justice, generosity, and 
fidelity as examples. (Moral virtues are good in themselves, whereas non-
moral virtues could be effective means to immoral projects.) A person can 
possess moral virtues even while holding certain kinds of skeptical views 
about morality. Even if I am skeptical about justice, I could still be ro-
bustly and non-instrumentally disposed to provide the goods associated 
with justice to other moral agents. Audi sketches how virtues could pro-
vide guidance in action and in identifying morally good persons. Rather 
than relying on the question, “What would a virtuous person do?” Audi 
recommends a “narrative approach,” envisioning how various answers 
would fit into the unfolding of an imagined or historical case (218–219).
The final part of the book (chs. 9–11) turn to questions of specific moral 
and political rights. Audi identifies rights as fundamental protections of 
agency, such that violations of rights typically impair or limit one’s op-
tion set in an objectionable way. Again working with a broadly Kantian 
system, Audi distinguishes between rights that entail a permission to pun-
ish or enforce from those that do not. Sometimes, the fact that an action 
would treat another as an end does not entail that the agent has a right 
that the action be performed. This creates space for moral failures that are 
also “morally protected” (240). In still other cases, a moral ideal might be 
voluntary; acting on such ideals is good, but optional and supererogatory.
With this conceptual background, Audi turns to two cases of disputes 
about rights. The first is about science education in a pluralistic democratic 
society, which includes religious members. At issue: can evolutionary bi-
ology be taught in a way that respects religious members of the society? 
Audi considers whether the “scientific habit of mind”—roughly, a dispo-
sition to seek evidence before accepting hypotheses—is rightly associated 
with a kind of non-theistic naturalism (257). Although one might suspect 
there is some tension between theism and a disposition of this sort, Audi 
notes that the conflict can be managed with resources internal to religion. 
Many religious traditions provide reasons in favor of scientific study of 
the natural world. Borrowing Audi’s terminology from Part I, we might 
say that religious traditions can understand this investigation as inher-
ently good—a candidate for a choiceworthy human pursuit. Likewise, one 
could understand theological claims as, themselves, amenable to testing. 
So it is a mistake to see a deep contradiction between scientific method or 
disposition on one hand, and religion on the other.
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Audi favors general principles according to which governments should 
allow free exercise of religion and maintain neutrality among different 
religious groups. Here he again applies the principle of secular rationale. 
For example, a high school teacher should not introduce materials (at least 
in a coercive way) without meeting this criterion. Audi’s principle has at-
tracted some criticism in the philosophical literature. Objectors worry that 
the principle demands that religious citizens make a mental distinction 
between religious and secular considerations that, internal to their own 
view, might not be well-supported. And they fear that it misunderstands 
how religious citizens think about their lives, which does not easily allow 
for a switch to thinking in a secular mode. Audi declines to cede ground 
to these concerns. He maintains that one can think of one’s religion as 
“concerning my whole existence” and still differentiate between reli-
gious and secular reasons (269). Indeed, some religions may even provide 
grounds—like respect for other persons—for treating such differentiation 
as a virtue.
The volume’s final chapter takes up competing values of nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism. Defenders of the former ideal regard moral reasons 
relating to members of their national group as having some measure of 
priority, while defenders of the latter ideal are concerned with humanity 
in general. In the end, Audi is skeptical about the prospects for a “per-
fectly general answer” to the debate between these alternatives (296). One 
can give priority to one’s own group and still promote general human 
interests.
As this overview hopefully illustrates, Reasons, Rights, and Values is 
a wide ranging but coherent volume. To underscore the latter virtue, I 
will raise two questions that draw on multiple aspects of the work. First, 
what exactly grounds the principle of secular rationale? Audi appeals to 
the idea of respect for persons, one interpretation of which is given in 
his principle of tolerance: we should regard political opponents as our 
epistemic peers. This seems like generally sensible advice. If we want to 
coerce other people, we would do well to think of ourselves as in their 
justificatory debt. Nevertheless, it seems that we sometimes are in position 
to know that another agent is not our epistemic peer. Perhaps we can see 
that they inhabit a perverse epistemic environment, or perhaps we can 
observe from their lack of compliance with moral or practical principles 
that they are failing to apprehend what Audi might agree are self-evident 
moral truths? If we are in a position to know moral truths (as Audi al-
lows), and another rational agent with the same evidence comes to deny 
a known moral truth, then it seems we can infer this agent is making a 
mistake. They might not be our epistemic peer, after all. Perhaps there is 
no reason, secular or otherwise, that such an agent might actually accept 
as a justification. Why suppose, in such cases, that we are better respecting 
them by offering a secular reason, rather than a religious one?
Second, consider again the final chapter’s moderate position within the 
debate between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Why does it follow 
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from Audi’s theory that we cannot say something more general between 
these two candidate values? After all, we can look back to Audi’s aug-
mented list of Rossian principles to find that no virtue of patriotism or 
loyalty is listed among them. And this does not seem to be mere oversight. 
It is at least plausible to suppose that—say—justice and non-injury could 
be accepted as moral principles from a mere conceptual understanding 
of morality. However, it seems significantly less plausible that privileging 
co-nationals above other persons could follow from a mere investigation 
of moral concepts. But let us be generous in assuming that somehow, we 
could follow Audi’s procedure and place a kind of patriotic loyalty on the 
list. In that case, how should we adjudicate between a prima facie cosmo-
politan duty (supported by our obligation to beneficence) and the prima 
facie patriotic duty? Among his weighting principles, Audi includes 
a principle to defer to the greater number of affected persons. In most 
normal cases, it seems that this would support favoring the cosmopolitan 
position above the nationalist one.
I raise these questions to draw appreciation to Audi’s work as much 
as criticism of it. My suggestion is that the theoretical resources he pro-
vides might be called on to help answer questions in more ways than the 
volume considers explicitly. Given the continuing importance of debates 
about global politics and religion in political society, the arguments of-
fered in Reasons, Rights, and Values provide a contribution of ongoing 
philosophical value.
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An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, by Thomas H. McCall. IVP Aca-
demic, 2015. Pp. 183. $22.00 (paper).
JAMES M. ARCADI, Fuller Theological Seminary
As a named entity, analytic theology has only been around since the 
2009 Oxford University Press publication of the edited volume Analytic 
Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, which introduced the 
phenomenon to the academic world. However, the practice of utilizing 
contemporary analytic philosophy for theological purposes stretches 
back at least as far as the 1960s and ‘70s in the pioneering work of the 
likes of Alvin Plantinga, Basil Mitchell, Richard Swinburne, and William 
Alston, among others. Despite a slew of articles and introductions over 
the past few years that describe and offer apologia for analytic theology, 
there have been two lacuna amidst these treatments. First, analytic theol-
ogy has lacked a book-length, one-stop shop that surveys what analytic 
theology is, is not, and could be. Although the 2009 book edited by Oliver 
